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PROHIBITION AND THE KANSAS
PROGRESSIVE EXAMPLE

PATRICK G. O'BRIEN

Wets and drys freely exchanged epithets as
Kansas began the twentieth century. They
agreed only upon the fact of mass violations of
prohibition. Kansas was dry in law and had
local option in reality; and cities like Wichita,
Kansas City, and Leavenworth had open
saloons that conducted business on main
streets in full public view. Kansas had a vast
amount of "wet" territory, but estimates varied
on exactly how much. One report of the
Kansas Temperance Union stated that twothirds of the 129 cities and towns surveyed in
1900 ignored prohibition laws.!
This situation created a "New Kansas
Crusade" to resolve the contradiction of
widespread wetness in an officially dry state.
The crusade turned militant as Carry A.
Nation and her saloon "hatchetations" riveted

the country's attention on the state. Of greater
consequence than "hatchetations," which
closed few saloons permanently and made the
perpetrators as lawless as the jointists, was the
renewed and assiduous political activity of
drys. They concentrated on the election of
local officials committed to prohibition enforcement, and could cite successes early in the
twentieth century. Salina, for example, elected
an enforcement mayor and changed its munic-,
ipal ordinances. Doing so, drys claimed, would
lower taxes, increase community Improvements , and help business.
PROf !!BIT!O!\ AND PRe )(JPfSSIVISM

Dry gain:; at the polls also reflected the fact
that prohibition was part of Kansas progressive
reform. Although historiam have tended to
regard the two as sep:lrdtc, the\' were philosophically compatihle and l,ulitic;dly fused in
Kansas. That fusion resulted III ;1 sliccession of
dry and reform governors from l'l(l') to I C) j lJ
who left a progressive impf!l!t.
"11 ,Ie] ell
expansive programs of great Cl bus!llcSS
tion, stronger COllsurner pro«'l't iOIl, lIKrc,lscd
labor benefits and rights, electoral and; 'arTY
reform, and fairer taxes.

Patrick G. O'Brien is director of the Center for
Great Plains Studies at Emporia State University.
He has published articles in Agricultural History, Wisconsin Magazine of History and other
journals.
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The po,;it io n of t h csl' go \ -ernor:; o n p ro hib it io n was based on the progrcssi\'e model o f
society, Curbi n g exp lo itatio n, promot ing p ublic and perso n al vi rt ue, and su pp ressi n g threat s
to the public \\'elfare , all goals of t h e proh ib itio n is ts, \\'(' re com i, t em wit h rrogress ive ideologv . T h e governo rs perccived n o d ifference
bet ween regul at ing greedy bus iness m en a n d
eradicating boo tleggers-bot h en da n ge red t h e
public. Pro h ib ition \\'as be n eficia l to Ka n sas , in
the ju dgm ent of the gover n o rs, and th at was
the o nl y Justifica tion they t h o ught n ecessary.
T ypi ca l was Gcwe rn o r Ed ward H och's cl aim
th ar "pro h ibi ti on in Kan sas is a great su ccess . I
do not be lieve there are 1,600,000 peop le
aI1\'\\'here o n eart h freer fro m th e ev ils o f
inte m perance and other \'ices, and wh o at th e
same time are more prospero us and h appy . " ,
Th e p rogressive gove rno rs used un precede nted stat e au th o rit y to exc ise t h e liq u o r
traffic , an d each \I'as confident t h at Kansas
could be wrung d ry. Their co n fide nce was n o t
to tall v base less. A large portio n of t h e Kan sas
popu latio n of na t i\'e stock a n d Pro test a nt fa ith
favored prohibition . The fusio n of proh ibit io n
and progress ivism had made t h e d ry posi ti o n
poli tica ll y in\'ldn er able, Wets h ad never been
as st ro n g a nd uni ted as dr ys , a nd t h ey lost
representation wh en t h e D emocrat ic Pan y
disca rd ed its h abi t ua l anti-pro hi b ition declaratio n in 1904. Wi th a dry m an date and sh attered \Iet oppos it io n, t h e gover n o rs coul d
pursue their object ive of an abso lute ly d ry
Ka nsas with imp u nit y, Thev lear n ed , h O\I'e\'er ,
that t he \ITt ' \\-ere obdur3te and res ili en t.
This Brucie surveys t h e efforts of th e
progressive gO\'e rno rs agail15t th e li qu o r traffic
and emphasi:es that the ir success \I'as qua lified
a nd en t ailed violation o f progressive max ims .
T he \'1olation in lmge part resu lted from t h e
untenab le pc)sitlon into \\'hi ch the gover no rs
helped put rhcm ::eln:s . Bv ado pting extreme
l'nforcemenr policies and encouraging unrea listi c dr y expel~ tarions, they cou ld not ad m it
£allure widwut repudiat ing their lHln cO I1\'icti()l1S ;Jll d in\'iting dr\' repri ' als. Thi s dilemma
induced t h e govern o rs to exaggerate the succe55 of their po lieit';: an d to port r ay Kansas as a

mo del dr y st at e, whi ch infl at ed the p ro hib iti o nist sentiment th at culmin ated in the Eigh tee nth Amendment.
Lack of cando r was n o t the gove rno rs' o nl y
divergence fro m p rogressive ideals. A ltho u gh
ideologicall y agai n st p ri vate influence in governm ent, they h ad few qu alms ab o ut dr y
arro ga ti o n of po wer. Pro hibitio nist o rganizatio n s fo rm ed a n earl y sy mb io ti c union with
progressive admini strati o n s, which virtually
ga ve them o ffi cial status. The prohibitio nist s'
u n restri cted access to the gove rn o rs and the
fac t that dry gro u ps had authorit y com pa rable
to that of governme nt raises seri ous q u esti o n s
o f pro pri ety.
A preoccup atio n with enforcem e nt di verted the st ate from significa nt p roblem s and led
to excesses . La ws fo r enfo rcing pro hibitio n
o ften in vested publi c o ffi cers with exceptional
powers and provided them additio n al co mpensatio n. This combination en couraged excesses
of autho rity and induced offi cers to n eglect
enforcement o f sign ifica nt laws that did n o t
carr y a pecuniary reward. The extent o f offi cial
m alfeasan ce cannot b e st ated exactl y , but
charges we re widespread. So m e drys , as well as
wets, labeled enfo rcement as a perfectl y lega l
ra cket , tho u gh it co ntributed t o o fficial ex pedien cy a nd pu b lic cy nicism. The gove rno rs
sanctio n ed the system o f enfo rcem ent a nd
su pported laws th at both e ntren ch ed it a nd
clash ed with citizen s' rights. Instru ctive is the
191 7 testimo n y of the Ka n sas atto rney ge n eral
supportin g a law to m ake possession o f intoxicating b everages a crime. S . M. Brewster
admitted th at the p roposed law wo uld m ake
" lawbreakers o ut of m en wh o d o n 't abuse the
keepink [sic] o f liquo r, " but explained it was
n ecessa ry t o attain absolute enfo rcem ent."
Although the laws were in theo ry to apply
u niforml y to all Ka n sa n s, in p racti ce they fe ll
heav il y o n cert ain ethnic grou ps . Some officials in locati o n s with large for eign co n centratio n s, like so utheast Kan sas, occasio n all y tried
to ex plain the fru strati o n o f enforcem ent to
the governors . A fe w eve n stated t h at the
b ootleggers wh o explo ited t h e ig noran ce o f the
immigr a nts we re the biggest problem. Progres-
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sive governors, having little patience with the
reasons why immigrants defied prohihition,
preferred drastic enforcement measures t( 1
education. Public attitudes enabled governors
to take actions against the immigrants that
would have heen unthinkahle tow;lrd other
groups, hut those actions evoked litt Ie puhlic
outrage and slight sympathy for the victims.
Prohihition 111 Kansas was definitely ;1
progressive reform, but it went ;lwry in some
important respects. Its hlueprint was hased on
a laudahle vision for society that failed when
translated to an imperfect world. This was
apparent in the enforcement convulsions of
the progressive Kansas administrations frorn
1905 to 19I 1).

Progressive Republican, editor of the Mmi
on

Record, ;md staunch prohibitionist, Gover-

nor Edward Hoch began his first administration in 1905 with a vow to cooperate "to the
full extent of official power" with the Kans;ls
Temperance Union. 11e invoked t he responsibility of his office, not personal predilection, as
his reason to enforce prohihition. An end to
prohibition violations was not "a quest ion of
temperance or even morality," according to
him, hut "simply a question of law enforcement." Although Hoch once conceded "there
may be a question as to majority ... sentiment in favor of prohibition," he was certain
of "the rnajority in favor of law enforcement."
As governor, therefore, he was only responding to the people of Kansas, who "demand the
enforcement of the law whether they arc
prohibitionists or not."" Hoch's attempt to
separate enforcement frOln the prohihition
issue itself in order to avoid emotional dehate
and political repercussions was hoth transparent and unsuccessful.
In a departure from the policies of previous
governors, Hoch denounced saloon licensing
and warned local officials of the consequences
if they failed to enforce the law. His promise to
squeeze Kansas dry and his firm statement on
enforcement earned hirn the accolades of drys.

FIG. 1.

GOVl'mOT

Edward Hoch.

Courtesy K:111S:1S

St:1te Historic:11 Society, TopeL!.

It W;lS one thing to pn)(\;lim t h;lt K;lIIS;lS
would stamp out the liquor tr:llk, hUI II(Kh
quickly learned it was another to do so. fie
gravely 1I1llkrcslimated till' s(,dl' ()f vi()hti')ll'"
He considered the prohihitory I:l\\' "Llirlv w(,l!
enforced" in 1')0 pencllt o! till' j()') K;111'.;I:,
counties, hased Up011 his :,urvcy (,: «HiIJt\
officials. A leading !H'\VSpapcr g(l! I1HilC' )'(' ; ill';
tic results frOln its ClJlV;lSS of I~ I count ics,
finding only 23 where offici:d:-:: genuinely tried
to enforce the bw. Eighteen were (lIK'llly wet)
with 41')0 "Iiccnsed" s;do()lIs :llHI ;111 lJl1Vl'rJfinl
number of liquor joints.
Public officials could he ex hurt cd t () do
their duty, hut governors h;ld limit cd lIll'ans III
compel them. f loch first tried persll:lsion wit h
a letter to every sheriff :llld (Hlllty ;l((orllcy
urging the enforcement ()f the Ll\\,. I\('~;ults
were mixed, and Ho(h ( l[Hludcd t h:lt (1)('
letters "resulted in IlHllh guud in the srn:dln
towns and counties, hUI Ihl'v h;ld lIllie dln I ill

the brger citieo." GO\'ernor Hoch could
appoint assistilnt attorne"s general with extensive authority to cIlfcm:e pmhibition in thL'
counties. During hi" fir"t \'eilr in office he
followed through hy "appointing attorneys in
every CUlIntv when' we think [hey are
needed.'" By the middle of 1006, he commented on their lIne\'cn :;ueeess, and indiL'ated
his pri\'ate skepticism when he \\Tute, "I have
appointed. . eight or nine assistant attornev
generals, but with few exceptions the result has
not been very satisfactory." Obviously, the
problems that had confronted public official"
in many counties also stvmied those appointed
by Hoch; and certain of the assistant attorneys
general were accused of ineptitude and malfeasance, \X1hen local officials were completely
refractory, Hoch's last resort was to initiate
ouster proceedings. Even this extreme measure
did not always get impressive results.
The enforcement powers of the governors
were limited by budget. Hoch and his successors habitually complained about the paltry
enforcement contingency fund. Stark economy forced Hoch to concentrate his enforcement efforts and resources where prohibition
violations were flagrant and chronic: Kansas
City, Wichita, and Crawford and Cherokee
counties." Even the pretense of prohibition
compliance had been abandoned in Kansas
City, where drunkenness purportedly made
the streets unsafe for women. The city became
Hoch's primary enforcement target, and the
resulting uproar attracted national attention.
Because his imbroglio with Kansas City officials, especially the mayor, was long and hitter,
the enforcement drive was less than a complete
,md permanent success. William \\/. Rose, a
Henrv George single-taxer and heliever in
municipal ownership of utilities who had heen
elected mayor in 1905, eschewed hypocrisy
and used the saloons to raise revenues. Joint
keepers regularly put up bonds that were
forfeited to the city treasury when the jointists
failed to appear in court. Mayor Rose was
honest in collections and freely admitted to
anyone that the system existed: when rebuked
for violating the prohibitinn statutes, he

bluntly rejoined, "Damn the law."
A clash between Governor Hoch and
~layor RC):ie wa, perhaps inevitable, but the
decision to close Missouri saloons on Sundays
precipitated it. Calling the closing a farce, Rose
refused to follow the Missouri example.
Thirst\" crowds surged across the state line into
Kansas City, Kansas, saloons and the subsequent storm of protest led Hoch to have ouster
suits filed against the mavor and county
attorney. Rose, offering no defense, resigned
two clays before the Kansas Supreme Court
declared him ousted, but he immediately filed
as a candidate for the office he had vacated
and won the special election on 8 May 1906. In
a campaign waged along wet and dry lines, he
called prohibition a "curse" while his opponent promised to close the joints; this ensured
Rose the opposition of the Civic League, law
enforcers, and church folk. Rose's victory
margin of 1,441 votes out of 12,495 may be a
commentary on the proportion of godly and
law-abiding citizens in Kansas City. The
election was a rebuff of Hoch, hut it only
marked a setback in a fight that the governor
would soon win. When Rose resumed office,
the Kansas attorney general instituted contempt proceedings against him, and the Kansas Supreme Court on 6 July 1906 fined Rose
and ordered him to quit office.
While Hoch enjoyed accolades from the
drys for his action against Kansas City officials, attorney C. W. Trickett led an enforcement offensive in the city. The effort was
intense: reports of raids, arrests, and saloon
closings were common news items. A degree of
success in drying up Kansas City could he
legitimately claimed, and a Southern Methodist Church steward wrote that, with the joint
closings, "insted [sic} of seeing a dozen drunken men pass my house I only saw one last
Sunday."ll Some observers, however, thought
the situation little changed, except that bootleggers were more furtive, saloons better concealed, and customers more cautious. When
Alabamians visited Kansas City in 1907 to
judge its dryness, they reported that they had
"bought and paid for five hottles of whiskey, at

fi \'e loca t ions ," ,
G O\'erno r H o ch asserted th at the Kans as
Cit\' campaign "broke the b ack of la \\ l e~~ne5::"
and " mad e t he enforcement of the !a\\' in o t her
cities m uc h easie r." - T hat clai m is n o t rea d ilv
subst antiat ed b\' his exper ience \\'i t h \\'ich it a
a n d the so utheas t Kamas cou nti es, \ \ 'ich it a
was as we t \\'h en H och roo k offi ce as it had
been in it s cow wwn er a , a nd his ca mpa ign
the re p aralleled t hat in Ka nsa s C it\" A gener al
imp ression \\a5 t h at as man\' sa loo n s \\ ere in
business after t h e camp a ign as b efo re , a ltho ugh a la rge number ha d probabh' clo sed
temporarih' , On l\, one sa loo n was shut permane ntl y- after someo n e took a ca r n iva l eleph a n t th ere a nd got it drunk, enraged animal
love rs clos ed t h e saloon ,
In Cr awfo rd and Cherok ee counties , p roh ib it io n offens i\-es, wit h o ut excep tion termed
suc cessful, \\"C re fo ll O\\'ed b\' rene\\'ed bootleggin g and the reopening of salo ons ; then th e
cycle would be repeated, As in the ca se of
Kansas Ci t \' a nd \'\'ich it a, H och cou ld sh o w
gai n s in terms of arrests, convict io n s, and
sa loo n clo sin gs ; but these counti es \\'ith lar ge
immigr ant populat ions \\'ere n ever drv \\, hi le
h e \\'as gover no r. - Oth er portio n s of t h e st ate
sh o wed n o ch an ge, a n d t h is led proh ibiti o n ists
\\'h o had earli er expressed unstinting p raise for
th e go vern o r to ch ide him , Angered, H och
asse rted , "Condi tions arc ben er toda\'
, . , than thev have been si nce t he law \\'as
passe d," and compl ained , "I am ge tting fatigu ed with cri ticism fr o m people \\' h o o u gh t to
be com m en d ing me ." Once eager to expand
st ate respo n sib ility in enfo rce ment, H oc h cam e
to be lie\'e th at loc al att itudes were a large part
of t he prob lem , He concl u ded th at "the people
mu st lear n not to sh ift the responsib il it y to
some dist a nt authorit v , to the G overnor or
atto rney general, but mus t gr a\' elv b ear it
th emseh"es, " ,
H och cou ld legit im ateh' d ecl are , " 1 h 2\'e
do n e more to enforce the prohib itot\, la\\' th an
an\' gover no r of t he st ate . . . in fifteen
vea rs. " , But h e co n sistentl y embe ll ished h is
su ccesses and hid hi s fa ilures a nd pri\-at e
fru strations. Although the liquo r traffic \\'as

set back in his admmi ;.:rrc1t ioI! , Kans d::' \\a;; sull
\\'et wh en he ler't ,)fflLe. Yet H Cl:h ,
th at th e
could effuse, "\\'c afe re C1!' i n~ C1 :~e\\ ~-i \ !k a t ic' n
h ere and to a Kansa s I~l dn fan:. ilu f \\ id:. these
good th mgs it seem" lCl c~ redib le." l:-li~ e \ldenee : 'IO f th. e 1 \.~ 5 (~()~lnti. e~ . . lJrl h.- : 1 hd \ "e
am' pa upers , Thi rt\ -fi\c ha\e th eir
clbsolut el\' em pt\. Th irt\'-se\'en h2\ 'C n o ([, fmna l
cases o n their d oc ketS , K an 53s has th e :sm,~ llest
n u mbe r of pau pe fS o f an\' State in pro;Junio n
to po pulation. It 5pend~ mo re m o ne\' tor
tha n
edu cat ion in propo rtio n to its
an v o t her State, ":.

Progr essive R epu l~lican \:\' alter .-\ . Stubbs,
in augura ted in 1909 , \\35 more ::ealods. H oc h
tr affic :
h ad m ade inroads against the

FIG , 2.

GOt emOT

W·'den A, Swbbs. C o urtesy

Ka nsas State H isto ri cal Society, To peka.

224 GREAT PLAI]\;S QUARTERLY, FALL 1987

Stubbs was determined to eradicate it. The
1909 bone-dry law, which easily passed the
legislature and banned the sale of liquor for
any reason, was his favorite tool. Although the
previous law, allowing restricted sale for specific purposes, could not be enforced, drys
maintained that the more comprehensive and
stringent new law would make enforcement
easier. They were only partially correct. Prohibitionists could claim that stricter laws rendered Kansas drier, but that claim could be
refuted by the increased number of violations
of the new law. This dilemma may explain the
oscillation of the drys between deploring mass
violation of the law and praising the dryness of
Kansas.
Like Hoch, Stubbs concentrated on egregiously wet spots, but he made Crawford and
Cherokee counties his first priority. His 1909
and 1910 campaigns against them made
Hoch's pale by comparison, but it is nearly
impossible to gauge Stubbs's success.:: Enforcement varied widely according to location and
time; it was not unusual to have a location
certified dry one week and reported wet the
next. The saloons in many of the mining
camps and small towns never closed. Closed
saloons often reopened, or their closing led to
an increase in kitchen joints, clubs, and
bootlegging. Stubbs could perhaps claim progress against the liquor traffic, but his frequent
contention that Kansas had no open saloons
and was drier than ever before in its history
was dubious. Frustrated by these failures,
Stubbs pulled out all stops to suppress the
southeast Kansas liquor traffic. He threatened
public officials he considered tepid on enforcement or in collusion with violators with
expulsion from office and carried out some of
these threats. He used undercover agents,
usually endorsed by the Kansas Temperance
Union, who habitually violated the prohibition and vice laws in order to obtain evidence.
Their written reports and itemized expense
accounts confirm that they engaged in many
unsavory activities to make Kansas dry and
virtuous.!' The use of agents who were themselves lawbreakers raises serious doubts about

the ethics of enforcement practices.
Perhaps Stubbs's least conscionable act was
a conspiracy against Italian mining camps that
had proved refractory. An advisor suggested
that Stubbs use an Anti-Horse Thief League to
destroy the Italian camps, accomplishing all
that the militia could "but without the odium
of its being said the militia was used to enforce
prohibition."" While the League was being
reconstituted, conspirators in Topeka obtained weapons, gathered men from the governor's office and the Kansas Temperance Union
to assist with the mission, and "mapped out a
line of action."" With an announcement that a
volunteer association with the legal power to
smash the liquor traffic had been formed, the
Topeka men were ordered into southeast
Kansas. When District Judge E. E. Sapp
learned of their arrival and threatened to have
them arrested if they proceeded with the plot,
the men returned to Topeka. Governor
Stubbs openly proclaimed that he would use
the militia if necessary and warned he would
end prohibition violations "even if I have to
smash and burn the wagons that carry the beer
and tear down the houses in which beer is
sold." Sapp rejoined that the use of militia
would be an "armed invasion" and he would
personally lead citizens against it." An armed
confrontation was avoided.
Stubbs began his last and most ambitious
campaign against liquor interests in southeast
Kansas in late 1912. Again, the enforcement
gains may have been genuine, but they were
short-lived. On 3 January 1913 an agent in
southeast Kansas reported "Conditions down
here and especially in Cherokee County are
bad."!; Predictably, Stubbs did not make this
final report public.
While the governor ignored violations in
many locations, he pronounced Kansas virtually dry, basing his claims upon his intense
and publicized campaigns in selected wet cities.
Stubbs's attempts to dry them out often had
the same results as in Crawford and Cherokee
counties, and he was just as unwilling to
concede limits to his success. Progressive
governors wanted Topeka, the capital city, to
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be a dry example, yet one of Stubbs's agents
informed him in mid 1912 that "I find ... T 0peka in a very wet condition and have seen
liquor unloaded in 25 or 30 ... joints."" Only
ten days later, Stubbs wrote W. F. Turrentine,
a small-town newspaper editor who had reported violations in Topeka, "I do not believe
there is a single place where liquor is sold over
the bar. "29 To justify his claim, the governor
ordered the Shawnee County attorney to
eradicate any liquor traffic, and the chastened
official explained that the "exaggerated" stories
of violations resulted from the political malice
of disaffected Germans. i,'
Conditions in Wichita frustrated every
governor and perhaps Stubbs the most. He
told the mayor in late 1911 that the "state of
lawlessness existing in Wichita ... is absolutely intolerable. "ll Stubbs threatened officials,
unleashed agents, and held the Kansas attorney general personally liable in a campaign to
crush the illegal Wichita liquor business. The
first results were negligible, but progress did
follow.]2 Drys and some local politicians later
asserted briefly that Wichita had been drained
of "suds" and "rotgut," but while Stubbs
probably made it more expensive and inconvenient for Wichitans to drink, he could not stop
them. In Wichita, as in many other targeted
cities, the liquor traffic survived through
caution, adaptiveness, and official leniency.
When joints became less visible, many sanguine drys reached the unwarranted conclusion that the liquor traffic had been
permanently dealt with, that customers had
become teetotalers from necessity. Stubbs's
self-congratulation about Wichita was interrupted by a packing-house manager who told
him that "before the town went dry, we had
but very little drinking among our employees,
since then, not a single day goes by but what a
half dozen or so have to be sent home or
permanently discharged for intoxication."li
Dry gains could be deceptive.
Kansas had the reputation as the temperance leader of all the states. Drys everywhere
looked to it to confirm that prohibition really
worked, and a sense of responsibility encour-

aged Kansas governors to describe the state in
terms that were incongruous with wet realities.
Governor Stubbs issued habitual assurances
that Kansas was "the driest state in the
union." He tried to conceal the real conditions
and convey the sense to the country that
prohibition was a great success. While Wichita
was "wide open" and complaints of violations
in Crawford and Cherokee counties flooded
his office, Stubbs informed a California prohibitionist, "There is not an open joint in the
state today according to reports received this
morning."" He expanded his claims when he
answered an inquiry from Idaho with the
statement that "every city in Kansas above
twenty-five thousand is absolutely dry."" This
was about the time that Stubbs's own agent
reported that Topeka was "very wet." Stubbs
and the rest of the governors convinced the
nation that prohibition worked, but they
would be largely responsible for the derision of
Kansans when the country became disaffected
with Prohibition in the next generation.
GOVERNOR GEORGE H. HODGES: 1913-1915

Democrat George H. Hodges, Stubbs's
successor, stated unequivocally that prohibition was the "best law Kansas ever put on its
statute books," and he promised his administration would be a model of enforcement."
Hodges had inviolate dry convictions, but
zealots feared that the Democrat would be
tepid on enforcement. Their qualms had a
germ of validity although there is no evidence
that he was influenced by the fact that a
disproportionate number of violators would
probably be Democrats. Learning perhaps
from his predecessors, the new governor
discarded highly publicized campaigns and
loud rhetoric. This may have appeared passive,
but the emphasis on quiet, grassroots enforcement had few political liabilities.
Hodges granted local officials the primary
responsibility to enforce prohibition laws,
since the governor believed that "local law
enforcements are much better than a sporadic
effort from people on the outside."" This was
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FIG. 3. Gotemor George H. Hodges. Courtesy
Kansas State Historical Society , Topeka.

an unconcealed jab against Stubbs, who had
rashly intruded into local situations, and an
endorsement of Hoch's earlier position.
Hodges also renounced selective campaigns
against "soaking wet" locations and supported
uniform state\\'ide enforcement. "\Ve do not
expect," he explained, "to pick out any particular locality and use extraneous effort to
enforce the laws in that localitv, while other
portions of the state are dealt more leniently
\\'ith.
Hodges did not bother to note that
limited resources made it impossible for the
state assiduousk to enforce prohibition evervwhere.
The contrast between Stubbs and Hodges
was pronounced. The former's campaigns were
attended bv eXpanSl\'e publicit\· while the
latter subscribed to quiet enforcement. Hodges

asserted that "the prohibition law is far better
enforced ... than it has ever been and we are
doing this without brass, bands."c Perhaps
Stubbs had earned some accolades for aggressive campaigns, but massive publicity carried
liabilities. By eschewing inflated publicity,
Hodges could claim great success in his endeavor to close down joints and drive the
bootleggers out of the state, and his claim
could not be easily refuted in the absence of
contrary publicity.
Adhering to his announced policy of local
responsibility, Hodges ignored pleas that had
worked with earlier governors. For instance,
the Citizens League of Cherokee County wired
Hodges on 1 Julv 1913: "\Ve need help a
minister assaulted today by a mob of jointists
and dangerously injured official."" Help was
not forthcoming. \Vhen the League wrote
Governor Hodges the next month about joints
and corrupt officials, his secretary answered:
"Quit complaining and get the evidence [to]
accomplish some real good for the cause of law
enforcement in 'lour county.""' Hodges appeared nearly unconcerned about reports of
violations. Information about open saloons in
southeast Kansas provoked no great outburst
of activity in the governor's office and neither
did the complaint that t\\'o third-grade students, who sold bottles in saloons, were under
the influence of whiskey at the school>
Hodges was not lackadaisical, however; he had
a different strategy for suppressing the liquor
traffic.
Prohibition enforcement was "primarilv in
the hands of the people," according to Hodges,
and they could best attain it when they "elect
men who are in svmpathy with law enforcement, and if thev fail to keep their pre-election
promises, to relegate them to private life at the
next election." Elementary civics, widely ignored bv many drys, indicated that "public
officers will respect dominant public sentiment. If 'lOU have a strong sentiment for the
enforcement of the law in your community,
'lOU will get it enforced. If 'lOU do not have
such a sentiment, 'lour public officers
will ... be lax.""' Although this sounds as if
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Hodges favored a local option solution, he had
perceived a change in public attitudes that
entailed a change in enforcement tactics.
Whereas Kansans earlier had been closely
divided on prohibition, Hodges discerned that
the dry territory was growing, as indicated by
the election of town, city, and county officials
on dry platforms. If the problem had once
been to secure public compliance with prohibition, the greater problem now was to ensure
that elected officials enforced the laws.
Hodges, therefore, concentrated on them, and
one of his principal enforcement policies was
to bring ouster suits against officials deemed
remiss in their duties.
Soon after he assumed office, Hodges
convinced himself that he had made Kansas
virtually dry. When a citizen complained in
January 1913 of widespread liquor violations in
Cherokee County, Hodges replied, "Your part
of the state is perhaps no worse than a great
many other 10calities."44 By April he boasted
that, in stemming violations, "we are succeeding now as never before."" By May Kansas had
"very little bootlegging and very few joints.""
And finally in July he declared that there was
"not an open saloon in the state."': Hodges
had mentally transformed Kansas from a wet
state to an arid one within six months. It was
easier to declare Kansas dry and enjoy the
benefits than to attempt to make it so and reap
the consequences of failure. Although he was
defeated for reelection in 1914, Hodges left
office with a national reputation as an inveterate prohibitionist and the next year became an
Anti-Saloon League lecturer.
GOVERNOR ARTHUR CAPPER: 1915-1919

Republican Arthur Capper would become
one of America's foremost prohibitionists and
leader of the Farm Bloc while in the U.S.
Senate. Capper congratulated the country in
1918 on the fact that if would soon join dry
Kansas and enjoy the same benefits. "Prohibition has been an unqualified success from
every standpoint in Kansas," he authoritatively informed the nation, and unctuously added,

"Our people know and appreciate the blessings-material, moral, and spiritually which
have come to them because they have not
been cursed by the saloon and its attendant
vices."" Yet, Capper's own papers belie his
claims.
Soon after the assumption of office, Governor Capper ordered investigations in Kansas
City and Wyandotte County. As a result,
misconduct charges were filed against the
Kansas City election commissioner for neglecting his duties while he lobbied in Topeka
against anti-liquor legislation, and grounds
were revealed for an ouster suit against a
Wyandotte County commissioner. Although
these officials were not specifically charged
with prohibition violations, the investigation
had revealed widespread vice and wetness.
One operative informed the governor: "I have
succeeded in finding out that drinking and
gambling is in full blast in the Slav colonies,
and, as I understand it, is being done under
police protection. "'" Investigators visiting
premises filed reports in the vein of "Joint at
615 Ferry was running full blast today. Menwomen and even children were there and
drinking keg beer. This place is running and
has been ... for more than a year and I saw a
policeman in full uniform in there.";" These
confidential reports make especially interesting
reading in the light of the intermittent assertions since Hoch that Kansas City was dry.
Indicative of the situation in Wichita was
the arrest in 1915 of Police Chief O. K.
Stewart for selling confiscated whiskey in city
hall. Three wagonloads of whiskey and beer
stored there were dumped in the Arkansas
River several days later. A Wichita city
commissioner informed Capper in 1916 that
"the town has not been as open in years as it
has been now for several months."" Kansas
Attorney General S. M. Brewster, however,
acceded to the pleas of the Sedgwick County
attorney and of Henry J. Allen-prohibitionist, newspaper publisher, and next governor-to avoid state intervention. i. Later
convinced that local officials were not diligently dealing with violators, Brewster demanded
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that the county attorney indicate why the
state should not become involved. The county
attorney evaded a direct answer, but admitted
that the law was being violated, enumerated
the obstacles to enforcement, and offered no
hope that conditions would improve until
local officials had greater authority, higher
budgets, and larger staffs. "
Habitually wet Cherokee and Crawford
counties posed problems. The Crawford county attorney, however, wrote Capper, "I fell [sic]
confident that conditions are improving in our
county ... and I also fell [sic] confident that
conditions will continue to improve."'" The
attorney of the adjacent county was less
optimistic. Prohibition convictions were down,
and he recounted problems with enforcement:
Many of our inhabitants are foreigners who
are accustomed to the daily use of beer and
other intoxicants and sentiment among
these people is naturally against the prohibitory law. The violation of this law usually
occurs in residences, and it is quite difficult
to obtain evidence necessary to secure
convictions. Attention may also be called
to the fact that Cherokee County is located
in the extreme south-east corner of the state
on the border of Missouri and Oklahoma.
This ... adds to the difficulty of enforcing
this law."
Such violations embarrassed state officials in
1916 when a Pathe Weekly News newsreel
showed wagons loaded with beer and liquor in
Drydale, Missouri, for delivery into Kansas
and streams of thirsty Kansans crossing the
line with jugs and bottles. The mockingly
named Drydale, located just across the river
from Leavenworth, had enough saloons to
supply many Kansans. Offended by the newsreel, the state censor board banned it in
Kansas."
The 1917 Kansas bone-dry law was designed to eliminate the bulk of enforcement
problems. Informed by Wayne B. Wheeler,
general counsel of the Anti-Saloon League,
that the "whole country looks to Kansas for

leadership in prohibition laws and law enforcement," the legislature passed a bill that made
possession of alcoholic beverages a misdemeanor. It was signed by Capper on 23 February
1917 in the lower house chamber, "while 150
legislators stood around the speaker's rostrum
and sang with gusto 'No One Knows How Dry
I Am.' "s; The national press agreed with
Kansas drys that the law was one of the most
drastic prohibition measures ever enacted in
any state.
Capper insisted that the law curbed the use
of alcohol but Kansas still was not dry.
Southeast Kansas continued to be a bane to
the governor, and the missionary societies of
the Neosho Presbytery complained in May
1918 of flagrant violations of prohibition in
Crawford and Cherokee counties." A growing
bootlegging industry in the two southeastern
counties would subsequently become a large
supplier of illegal liquor to the rest of the
country. The 1931 Wickersham Report on
prohibition enforcement commented on the
bootleggers' "fine brands of whiskey," which
they claimed "compares well with the best
Government or legitimate alcohol. "5'
After passage of the 1917 bone-dry legislation, Capper regarded "irresponsible" neighbors, especially Missouri, as the cause of
enforcement problems. He habitually appealed, with slight success, for the Missouri
governor to help stop the flow of liquor into
Kansas. Capper proposed a "sanitary zone"
between the two Kansas Citys with no saloon
within six hundred feet of Kansas, and protested against the Missouri saloons and distilleries that lured Kansas customers.'" A bitter
exchange ensued between officials of the two
states. Kansas authorities accused Missouri
county officials of negligence and even culpability, and the Missouri officials issued angry
countercharges. One conceded that "conditions on the line have been bad," but rebuked
Kansas officials for failure to give those in
Missouri "the support they could or should."
Charging that Kansas authorities made "no
effort" to prevent their citizens from bringing
liquor into their state, a second Missourian
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complained, "I am getting tired, of those
officers in Kansas continually howling when
... they are not in good faith, and ... in the
Northern part of Cherokee County and in
Crawford County, Kansas, a number of
Greeks are running joints openly, publicly and
on Sunday and are never arrested."'i Cooperation eluded the officials of the two states, and
there is no evidence that the entry of liquor
into Kansas was curbed. Missouri officials may
have been remiss in enforcement, but so were
Kansas authorities, especially in the southeastern part of the state. Capper sincerely wished
to stop the interstate liquor traffic, but it was
easier for him to rail against Missourians than
to enforce compliance in Kansas.
CONCLUSION

Kansas prohibitionists believed that outside wet influences contributed appreciably to
violations after 1917. The legislature's eager
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment
reflected in part the conviction that a dry
nation was needed to make Kansas genuinely
dry. Upset that a truly dry Kansas did not
materialize during national Prohibition, a new
generation of governors readily found new
explanations for wetness. Like the earlier
progressive governors, they usually did so
without serious examination of their own
position.
The progressive governors' habitual claim
that Kansas was the driest state, though
excessive, was not totally without foundation.
A large portion of the Kansas population did
not drink and lived in nearly dry communities.
Drys, however, either misunderstood or
misrepresented the relationship between legal
compulsion and Kansas abstemiousness. Many
Kansans eschewed liquor because of personal
belief, not because of the legal proscription.
The real test of prohibition occurred where it
clashed with a population that did not oppose
drinking, and it was less than a resounding
success. Prohibition was naturally the hardest
to enforce in exactly the spots where the
governors concentrated their efforts. Enforce-

ment campaigns and growing dry sentiment
may have lessened violations, but Kansas was
not bone-dry on the eve of national Prohibition.
Kansas governors from Hoch through
Capper subscribed to prohibition on the
progressive grounds that it would raise the
moral standards of society and ensure the
advance of humanity, but prohibition was not
the only progressive reform that undermined
the principles on which it was based. The
excesses and hypocrisy of the Eighteenth
Amendment, not its idealism, have heen
ingrained in American consciousness, a result
that could have been predicted, had the
Kansas governors realistically appraised their
experience. Perhaps the country would have
forgiven the dismal aspects of Prohibition had
it delivered what it promised. Kansas provided
a case in point that absolute prohibition was
unattainable.
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